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Still better together? Purpose and power in
intergovernmental councils in the UK
Nicola McEwen
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
Intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom were intended to be
predominantly informal, but a machinery of intergovernmental councils (IGCs)
developed alongside informal relations. This article examines the
development, purpose and dynamics of the UK’s IGCs, with a particular focus
on the multilateral Joint Ministerial Committee and the bilateral Joint
Exchequer Committees. These IGCs remain weakly institutionalized and
multilateral forums, in particular, are regarded by the devolved governments
as providing limited opportunities for exercising influence. By contrast,
bilateral IGCs have enabled devolved governments to utilize a range of non-
constitutional resources to exert influence, irrespective of their relative
constitutional weakness. The Brexit referendum generated an intensification
of multilateral IGCs while exposing their weaknesses as forums for the
exercise of shared rule. The purpose and dynamics within IGCs are shaped by
the asymmetrical distribution of power, continued constitutional hierarchy,
party competition and competing nationalist projects.
KEYWORDS UK; devolution; intergovernmental relations; JMC; JEC; Brexit
Introduction
The United Kingdom is a relative newcomer to multi-level government. For
much of the twentieth century, it was one of the most centralized states in
Europe, save for a period of devolution in Northern Ireland between the par-
tition of the island of Ireland in 1921 to the imposition of direct rule in 1972.
The introduction of devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1999 following suc-
cessful referenda, and its simultaneous, if sporadic, reintroduction to Northern
Ireland as part of the peace process,1 institutionalized varying degrees of self-
government to these three territories. England, by far the largest nation of the
UK, has continued to be governed by the state-wide institutions, and the
absence of devolution in England has created a profound constitutional asym-
metry in the structure of the state. This, coupled with the distinctive bottom-
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up motivations which generated the demand for, and ultimately the conces-
sion of, varying degrees of self-government, helps to explain why formal inter-
governmental relations have at best been an afterthought in the UK’s multi-
level system.
Intergovernmental relations between the UK and the devolved govern-
ments were intended to be mainly informal. Good communication, goodwill
and mutual trust were valued above developing mechanisms and forums
for formal coordination. A Memorandum of Understanding, a series of concor-
dats between the devolved governments and the departments of the UK Gov-
ernment, and a set of 16 Devolution Guidance Notes were to support a co-
operative working culture among civil servants on a day-to-day basis. In
keeping with UK parliamentary tradition and its central tenet of Westminster
parliamentary sovereignty, none of these agreements (excepting the Good
Friday Agreement) has statutory authority and none is binding in law,
though Poirier described them as ‘soft law instruments, with a slightly
harder edge’ (Poirier, 2001: 155; see also Rawlings, 2000).
Despite the emphasis upon informality, a machinery of multilateral and,
more recently, bilateral intergovernmental councils (henceforth IGCs2) has
nevertheless developed to facilitate communication, cooperation and consti-
tutional reform. In Bolleyer’s terms, these IGCs remain weakly or, in some
cases, moderately institutionalized (Bolleyer, 2009). Meetings are mainly irre-
gular and unscheduled, the infrastructure supporting them is often rather ad
hoc or minimal, and the IGCs usually lack the capacity to make decisions. The
council which represents the centrepiece of UK IGR – the multilateral Joint
Ministerial Committee (JMC) – rarely met at all in the early years of devolution
(Trench, 2004, 2007). The last decade, however, has witnessed a change.
Against the backdrop of increased party political incongruence in the compo-
sition of central and devolved governments, a shift from a benign financial
settlement to fiscal austerity, and the onset of ‘big’ constitutional politics –
from the Scottish independence referendum to the Brexit referendum – we
have seen increasing attention paid to the formal processes of intergovern-
mental relations. These developments have heightened demands from parlia-
ments, devolved governments and independent commissions for more
institutionalized multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental processes (Com-
mission on Devolution in Wales, 2014; Smith Commission, 2014; HL CC, 2015;
Welsh Government, 2017).
This article examines the development and dynamics of the UK’s IGCs. It
asks two key questions: (i) what is the purpose of the UK’s IGCs?; and (ii) do
they provide channels of meaningful influence for the devolved govern-
ments? In addressing the first question, the article looks beyond merely the
stated purpose set out in official remits to consider the motivations underpin-
ning the activity and interventions of the governments concerned. In addres-
sing the second question, it examines the power dynamics within IGCs and
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questions whether they provide devolved governments with an opportunity
to upload their preferences or secure concessions in line with their territorial
and policy objectives. After examining the evolution, purpose and power
dynamics within multilateral and bilateral IGCs in the UK, the article incorpor-
ates a small case study analysis of formal intra-UK intergovernmental relations
during the first phase of the process leading to the UK’s withdrawal from the
European Union, that is, from the referendum to the triggering of Article 50.
The period was marked by an intensification of formal IGR, including newmul-
tilateral IGCs, while its political salience, the candour of some participants, and
parliamentary oversight helped to shine a light on these otherwise opaque
processes.
Documents form the primary data underpinning the analysis. These
include official communiqués, government publications, intergovernmental
agreements, ministers’ and ex-ministers’ speeches, parliamentary committee
reports, and the testimony that those involved in intergovernmental relations
have provided to various parliamentary enquiries. These are supplemented by
informal interviews with officials and ministers. Given the sensitive and confi-
dential nature of IGR and in the interests of encouraging interviewees to speak
openly so as to gain maximum insight, interviews were unrecorded and con-
ducted with the assurance that contributions would be unattributed.
The article argues that constitutional asymmetry has constrained and
inhibited the development of IGCs, and governments have taken a pragmatic
approach to their use. The plurinational character of the state, especially
within the current context of competitive nation-building and contested con-
stitutional politics, shapes the motivations and trust of the actors involved.
The non-federal character of the state and the continued hierarchy in the con-
stitutional relationship between the UK Government and the devolved gov-
ernments affects power dynamics within IGCs, although the latter can
sometimes utilize ‘soft power’ tools to gain concessions. Although convened
in unique circumstances, the recent experiences of the Brexit-focused IGCs
expose the broader weaknesses of the UK’s intergovernmental machinery,
as well as the barriers in the way of more formal co-decision processes.
Powers and purpose of IGCs
IGCs represent the formal executive infrastructure through which central and
regional governments manage jurisdictional interdependencies. From the
perspective of the participating governments, they serve a variety of
purposes.
First, IGCs can be used to share or to seek information, either to promote
policy learning, to avoid detrimental impact from policy overspill, or to
share confidences about policy developments, upcoming events or
announcements which are not yet in the public domain. This purpose is
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also, and perhaps more effectively, served in less formal networks (Wright,
1982).
The second purpose of IGCs is to negotiate intergovernmental agreements
or to coordinate joint action (Parker, 2014). This is especially necessary for
more cooperative systems, where the powers and responsibilities of both
levels of government overlap or are interlocked. Such systems build in the
need to reach joint decisions or coordinate policy implementation into the
institutional design, most evidently in the German case (Auel, 2014). More
dualist systems, where each level of government enjoys a high degree of pol-
itical autonomy, contain the need for coordination and co-decision, but do
not eliminate it. Participation in such systems may be ad hoc and voluntary,
as in Canada, or highly institutionalized as in Belgium (Cameron and
Simeon, 2002; Poirier, 2002). The enthusiasm for, and intensity of, IGCs will
also be coloured by the policy field: more limited in locally oriented policy
spheres, but greater where there is more scope for overspill (e.g. environ-
mental or trade policy), higher political salience (e.g. distributive or consti-
tutional policy), or where implementing international agreements or
meeting EU obligations necessitate cooperation (Beyers and Bursens, 2006;
Benz, 2016).
Third, IGCs can provide opportunities for the exercise of shared rule,
enabling sub-state governments to exert influence over matters that, directly
or indirectly, affect their fields of jurisdiction. In systems without a territorial
second chamber, they are often the primary forum through which sub-state
governments seek to upload their own preferences so as to influence the pol-
icies, positions, actions and decisions of other governments, especially –
though not exclusively – central government. The extent to which regional
governments can exert influence over central government is shaped by the
constitutional rules of the game, for example, whether they have rights to
co-decision or veto over central government decision-making in areas that
impinge upon their competences (Hooghe et al., 2016). Non-constitutional
factors matter too, including the relative wealth of each order of government,
the balance of power within and across multi-level systems and the political
composition of governments (Bolleyer, 2009; McEwen et al, 2012; Aja and
Colino, 2014). In the context of party political incongruence, when govern-
ments are led by parties that compete against each other, there may be
more competition than cooperation between governments. This can result
in less willingness to cooperate or make concessions, and less confidence in
sharing privileged information.
Fourth, IGCs can also serve the purpose of preserving or enhancing ‘self-
rule’ (Agranoff, 2004; Lublin, 2014: 261). Especially in strong identity regions,
both multilateral and bilateral IGCs can be a useful channel through which
regional governments aim to maximize their decision-making autonomy, by
pushing constitutional boundaries and negotiating increased constitutional
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and policy competences, or by preventing central government from
encroaching upon regional jurisdiction. This relates to a fifth common
purpose of IGCs: to help avoid or resolve jurisdictional or financial disputes,
without recourse to the courts.
The features shaping the processes and purpose of IGCs also influence the
power dynamics within them. Power relations within IGCs are shaped by
formal constitutional rules. The power of sub-state governments may be con-
siderably enhanced where they have co-decision rights, voting strength or
the right of veto over key policy, fiscal or treaty-making decisions. This is
perhaps most obviously the case in intergovernmental decision-making in
Belgium, where the principle of in foro interno, in foro externo has given the
Regions and Communities considerable influence in determining Belgian pos-
itions in relation to trade and other international agreements which affect
their competences (Beyers and Bursens, 2013). In multi-level systems like
the UK, which do not formally divide sovereignty or remit powers of co-
decision to intergovernmental forums, the relationships within IGCs may be
more hierarchical, with central governments able to dictate the terms of
engagement.
On the other hand, even in non-federal systems, regional governments
may be able to at least partially mitigate constitutional inferiority by accessing
non-constitutional resources and using ‘soft power’ diplomacy. Such non-
constitutional resources can be wide-ranging. For example, a strong and
skilled leader can deploy political nous in intergovernmental negotiations. A
sub-state government with a strong popular mandate can bring added
legitimacy to intergovernmental deliberations, especially if faced with a
relatively weak central government. For example, the SNP’s success in the
2015 General Election, when they won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats in the
British House of Commons, considerably enhanced the SNP-led Scottish
Government’s claim to speak for Scotland in the intergovernmental arena.
The literature on small states, which highlights the ways in which these
states can exercise influence within the international community despite
their smallness, also provides insight into the ‘soft power’ options open to
sub-state regions in the intergovernmental arena. Small states can sometimes
overcome structural and resource disadvantages by developing ‘counterba-
lancing strategies’ (Panke, 2010), for example, by building alliances with
other governments, honing cogent arguments, and investing in network
and relationship building with policy actors in EU and international insti-
tutions (Arregui and Thomson, 2009; Jakobsen, 2009). Similarly, sub-state gov-
ernments may be better placed to shape and steer intergovernmental
negotiations and outcomes towards their preferences in areas of strategic pri-
ority, where they have built expertise and policy capacity within government,
and have key alliances within the policy community. In addition, just as small
states, through norm advocacy, framing, agenda-setting and diplomacy, can
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sometimes shape policy discourse, outputs and practice within EU or inter-
national institutions (Ingebritsen, 2002; Björkdahl, 2008), so too might sub-
state governments be able to influence the norms, ideas and framing of
issues on the intergovernmental agenda.
Power dynamics within intergovernmental arenas may also be shaped by
the alliances and antagonisms between the participating governments. Gov-
ernments in multi-level states, when led by parties that compete against each
other within each institutional tier, may be more inclined to regard IGCs as
sites of competition rather than cooperation, shaping and constraining the
capacity of sub-state governments to secure concessions in intergovernmen-
tal deliberations. Territorial politics can also be expected to shape dynamics
within IGCs. In federal and multi-level states, cooperative intergovernmental
relationships are dependent upon a commitment to mutual interdependence
and political unity alongside the recognition of diversity (Elazar, 1987; Burgess,
2012: 188–189). Despite often being designed to stem secessionist pressures,
neither a commitment to sharing power nor a desire to maintain unity can be
taken for granted in states that are plurinational. Intergovernmental relations
are often coloured by competitive nation-building and nationalist claims,
especially when secessionist parties are in power, with a detrimental impact
on relations of trust and the functioning of IGCs. For example, the Spanish
Conference of Presidents stopped meeting after 2012 amid the resurgence
of Catalan nationalism over fears that meetings would be politicized
(McEwen et al., 2015). As discussed below, competitive nation-building in
the UK after the election of the SNP to the government in Scotland in 2007
contributed to an intensification of IGR, but the issue of Scottish indepen-
dence coloured the nature of the relationships within ministerial conferences,
presenting both obstacles to, and opportunities for, meaningful influence for
the Scottish Government.
Power and purpose of multilateral IGCs
After the establishment of devolution in Scotland and Wales in 1999, and its
re-establishment in Northern Ireland, the UK Government and the devolved
governments agreed a Memorandum of Understanding (henceforth MoU)
and a series of Concordats intended to guide their day-to-day interaction in
a new era of multi-level government. Informal interaction would also be facili-
tated by the retention of a unified civil service serving Whitehall departments
and the Scottish and Welsh administrations, and cooperating closely with the
Northern Ireland civil service (Parry, 2012). The MoU also provided for the
establishment of a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) as a formal council
within which the governments would meet, either in plenary format, involving
the leaders of each government, or in functional format, with ministerial par-
ticipation dependent upon the policy under discussion.
6 N. MCEWEN
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The Joint Ministerial Committee
In the early years of devolution, the JMC met only a few times in plenary and
functional formats before becoming largely redundant in 2002 (Trench, 2004).
It was only resurrected after the deepening of party political incongruence in
the composition of governments after 2007 (McEwen et al., 2012). Thereafter,
the JMC was supposed to meet annually in plenary format (JMC(P)) and when
required (which was expected to be at least twice a year) in a domestic format
(JMC(D)). However, it did not meet in either of these formats between Decem-
ber 2014 and October 2016. Difficulties in agreeing mutually convenient dates
amid an intensive electoral cycle, rather than lack of will, appear to explain the
failure to convene the JMC(P). By contrast, the JMC(D) was regarded as rather
ineffectual and without a clear purpose, especially by the devolved govern-
ments, with officials citing asymmetrical devolution as making it difficult to
identify agenda items that could engage all participants (HL CC, 2015: 18–
19; interview with SG officials, 9 November 2016). The Scottish Government’s
first Annual Report on Intergovernmental Relations published in June 2017
noted: ‘The JMC(D) has not had cause to meet since March 2013 although
the option remains open to ministers to reconvene as necessary’ (Scottish
Government, 2017: 11).
What, then, is the purpose of the JMC(P)? Its formal remit, set out in the
MoU, is (i) to consider non-devolved matters which impinge on devolved
responsibilities, and devolved matters which impinge on non-devolved
responsibilities; (ii) to consider devolved matters if it is beneficial and mutually
agreeable to discuss their respective treatment in the different parts of the
United Kingdom; (iii) to keep the arrangements for liaison between the UK
Government and the devolved administrations under review; and (iv) to con-
sider disputes between the administrations (UK Government et al., 2013). The
emphasis upon consideration is deliberate, and underlines the weakness of
the JMC as a vehicle for shared rule. It was never intended to be a forum
for co-decision, nor even routine coordination. The MoU underlined the gov-
ernments’ shared commitment ‘wherever possible, to conduct business
through normal administrative channels, either at official or Ministerial level’
(UK Government et al., 2013: 10).
In 2010, under pressure from the devolved governments, a formal Protocol
for the Avoidance and Resolution of Disputes was introduced and has been
invoked on at least five occasions. This includes an ongoing (at the time of
writing) financial dispute lodged by the Scottish and Welsh Governments
over the Conservative UK Government’s deal with the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP), giving extra money to Northern Ireland in exchange for the
DUP’s support in the House of Commons. In keeping with the ethos of the
civil service and of the intentionally informal nature of UK IGR, the emphasis
within the protocol is to prevent disputes from emerging, and to resolve
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 7
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differences at working level or within the secretariat. The four disputes
invoked under the protocol in 2010–11 were resolved without recourse to
the ministerial meeting (HL CC, 2015: 14).
There is some scepticism on the part of the devolved administrations as to
the effectiveness of the JMC as a forum for resolving disputes, in light of the
asymmetry in intergovernmental relationships, and the dominant role of the
UK Government (Swenden and McEwen, 2014). For example, the former First
Minister of Northern Ireland, Peter Robinson, described the dispute resolution
procedure as ‘meaningless’: ‘At the end of the day, the Cabinet Office will
decide whether the Treasury was right. We do not think that is a very impartial
court to take our case to’ (Robinson, 2015, Q87). A former Secretary of State for
Scotland (a ministerial office of the UK Government) referred to the JMC as ‘a
forum for dispute declaration, if rarely for dispute resolution’ (Moore, 2016:
11). Scotland’s Deputy First Minister, John Swinney, recalled meetings with
the three devolved Administrations:
essentially saying to the UK Government, ‘We disagree with the stance you are
taking on fiscal policy, so we want you to relax the fiscal disciplines’. The UK Min-
isters would go through that and say, ‘We have heard you but we are the UK
Government. We have macroeconomic competence. This is our policy; this is
what we are doing’. (Swinney, 2016, Q355)
For its part, the UK Government – while formally talking up the value of the
JMC – also recognizes that it can be a forum within which the devolved gov-
ernments air grievances directly to the Prime Minister (interview with UKG
ofﬁcial, 22 November 2016; interview with former UK minister, 1 November
2016; see also evidence cited in HL CC, 2015: 17–18). Giving evidence to
the Lords Constitution Committee in 2015, Alistair Carmichael, the then Sec-
retary of State for Scotland, implicitly chastized his Scottish Government
counterparts for ‘continuing to use the points of interface between the Gov-
ernments as an excuse for generating grievance or friction between the Gov-
ernments’ (HL CC, 2015: 14).
These insights are suggestive of an inequality of formal power within the
JMC. The JMC is chaired by a UK Government minister and, after its resump-
tion in 2007 until 2017, always met in London. Although served by a joint sec-
retariat made up of officials from each of the governments, the primary
authority for the conduct of meetings continues to lie with the UK Govern-
ment. The devolved governments have complained that there is little oppor-
tunity to engage in constructive discussions on key issues of concern, due to
lack of time set aside for meetings (Scottish Government, 2015). Senior min-
isters from the devolved governments have criticized a culture within which
they are ‘brought in’ to meetings with the UK Government, instead of the
JMC operating as a forum in which four administrations work together. The
First Minister of Wales, Carwyn Jones, described the JMC as ‘basically a
8 N. MCEWEN
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Westminster creation that is designed to allow Westminster to discuss issues
with the devolved Administrations. It is not jointly owned… and it is not a
proper forum of four Administrations coming together to discuss issues of
mutual interest’ (Jones, 2015: Q46).
A relationship based on hierarchy has been increasingly challenged,
however, especially by the Scottish Government after the election of the
pro-independence SNP. Irrespective of disparities in size, constitutional com-
petence and sovereignty between the UK and Scottish governments, SNP
Government ministers have drawn upon their status as a national government
representing what they regard as distinctive national interests – a stance
reinforced by the SNP’s electoral strength after 2011 and the Conservative-
led UK Government’s relative weakness in Scotland. SNP Ministers posit the
Scottish Government as an equal partner in its engagements with the UK Gov-
ernment, rather than a subordinate player. Deputy First Minister, John
Swinney, stressed that effective intergovernmental machinery should be
based upon ‘parity of esteem’ and ‘mutual respect and trust’ – commonly
expressed sentiments among ministers and senior officials. He added: ‘The
UK Government and devolved administrations are equals in their areas of
competence, and this should be recognised in the level of respect between
them’ (Swinney, 2015). All devolved governments have at various points
stressed the need for ‘parity of esteem’, but there is a competitive, and
more assertive, edge in the SNP Government’s interaction with the UK Gov-
ernment which reflects its nationalist ambitions. Drawing on his observations
as a participant in the JMC, Peter Robinson, observed these dynamics: ‘To
some extent, there are two devolved institutions, which recognise that they
are devolved institutions, and one devolved institution that believes that it
is a sovereign state and has the standing of the Government’ (Robinson,
2015, Q87).
In assessing the purpose and dynamics within the JMC, it is difficult to dis-
entangle analytically the effects of party political incongruence from the com-
petitive nation-building associated with the independence debate, as in the
Scottish case at least, the two coincided. Officials from both the UK and Scot-
tish Governments noted that the independence issue both before and after
the referendum contributed to a loss of trust and information-sharing (inter-
view with SG officials, 8 November 2016; interview with UK official, 13 April
2017). This has affected both IGCs and less formal interactions; as one White-
hall official put it, the days when officials from both the UK and Scottish Gov-
ernments could have frank discussions in a private space are gone (interview
with UK official, 13 April 2017). Welsh–UK intergovernmental relations have
been conducted under conditions of party political incongruence since
2010. While this has coloured their formal and informal interactions, the con-
stitutional dependence of the Welsh Government on the UK Government to
exercise its legislative power was a source of frustration even under conditions
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 9
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of party congruence (Commission on Devolution in Wales, 2014; Swenden and
McEwen, 2014).
The JMC Europe
A third format of the JMC was always rather distinctive. The JMC (Europe) built
upon previous intra-governmental coordination between the Foreign Office
and the territorial ministries. In the early years, as ‘a good clearing house for
colleagues in the UK Government to sort out their interdepartmental issues
on European matters’ (Wallace, 2017: 17), it gave the devolved governments
privileged access to discussions over the UK Government’s EU policy formu-
lation. It later evolved to become a forum within which the devolved govern-
ments could have their say on upcoming issues to be discussed at European
Council meetings (Wallace, 2017: 17). It did not replace informal interaction; as
set out in the Concordat on Coordination of European Union Policy Issues, offi-
cials would continue to cooperate and share information as a matter of
routine (Scott, 2001). But in contrast to the other JMCs, meetings of the
JMC(E) were regular rather than ad hoc, conforming to the schedule of the
European Council. The UK Government maintained the authority to define
the UK’s negotiating position in Council meetings, but it used the JMC(E) to
take account of devolved government views. The JMC(E) thus provided an
opportunity for some influence, especially in areas where the devolved gov-
ernments could overcome their constitutional inferiority by developing stra-
tegic priorities and niche expertise, for example, in fisheries, animal welfare,
region-specific agriculture and structural funds (Bulmer et al., 2006: 84–86).
As such, the JMC(E) has been generally held in higher regard by ministerial
participants and observers (HL CC, 2015: 19; Paun and Munro, 2015: 72–73).
However, there is little evidence to suggest that non-constitutional
resources can overcome constitutional weaknesses in multilateral JMCs.
Even within the JMC(E), an imbalance of power remains, derived from the
UK Government’s constitutional authority over EU relations. Officials within
devolved governments report that meetings last around an hour and offer
limited scope for discussion. Agenda items are set by the upcoming European
Council agenda, with papers prepared by the relevant UK Government depart-
ment. Although they are supposed to be circulated well in advance, papers
often arrived late, leaving little time to consult with colleagues in relevant
policy departments, or to develop a clear position in advance of meetings.
There is some horizontal collaboration between devolved ministers in
advance of meetings, but also a perceived hierarchy in the degree of access
given to devolved governments, given the resource strength and policy
capacity of Scotland compared to Wales and Northern Ireland (Bulmer et al.,
2006: 86–87). The lack of follow-up after Council meetings has been a
source of frustration for the devolved governments and, usually bystanders
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with respect to EU representation,3 the devolved governments rarely got to
know whether their preferences were taken into account either by the UK
Government or the European Council (interview with SG officials, 8 November
2016; see also Paun and Munro, 2015: 73). The prospect of Brexit has already
affected the JMC(E). Meetings are less frequent, Brexit overshadows its discus-
sions, and the internal restructuring within Whitehall as a result of the creation
of the Department for Exiting the European Union has had a knock-on effect
on the level of resources and commitment to the JMC(E) (Scottish Govern-
ment, 2017: 8–9). Although still formally part of the EU pending completion
of Article 50 negotiations, the UK is now a disengaged Member State.
Multilateral IGCs beyond the JMC
The JMC is not the only IGC. Ministers and officials periodically meet in other
less formal forums. One example is the so-called ‘Finance Ministers’ Quadrilat-
eral’ (FMQ), which brings together devolved Finance ministers with a UK
Treasury Minister to discuss ongoing issues of common concern. The
formula-based system of territorial finance and the absence of a system of
equalization limit the need for formal ongoing multilateral intergovernmental
coordination on financial matters, but the combined effects of vertical fiscal
imbalance and fiscal austerity still produce periodic tensions over money (Gal-
lagher, 2012; Swenden and McEwen, 2014). The FMQ normally meets three
times per year, but did not meet at all for around three years as bilateral nego-
tiations on finance took precedence (see below). This forum sits outside of the
JMC framework, and appears even more hierarchical. It is regarded as useful
for sharing relevant financial information by both the UK Government and at
least some of the devolved governments (HL CC, 2015: 28). Michael Moore,
former Secretary of State for Scotland, described the FMQ rather more criti-
cally as ‘a vehicle for the Treasury to hand out announcements to the
devolved administrations…without any negotiation… Protest was heard,
but this was not a place for negotiation and agreement’ (Moore, 2016: 11).
There is more clarity of purpose and equality of status within the British–
Irish Council (BIC). Established as a product of the Good Friday Agreement
(1998), its eight member governments from across the British Isles meet reg-
ularly to ‘exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to
reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the
competence of the relevant administrations’ (GFA, strand 3). Its broader
purpose, however, is to help maintain peace in Northern Ireland (Clifford
and Morphet, 2015). The BIC has a small permanent secretariat based in Edin-
burgh (5 full-time seconded staff), and conducts its work across 12 policy
sectors, with varying levels of activity in each. Although most intergovern-
mental meetings take place among officials (there were 51 such meetings
in 2016), the BIC held 28 ministerial summits between its inception in 1999
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to the end of 2016, supplemented by more ad hoc ministerial meetings within
work streams, and periodic ‘extraordinary’ summits on key issues, for example,
on the outcome and implications of the Brexit referendum (BIC, 2016).
Although its importance to the Northern Ireland peace process is recognized
by all parties, the level of commitment varies. Whereas the Irish Taoiseach
always attends, the UK Government is usually represented by one or more
of the territorial secretaries or, during the coalition, the Deputy PM. The last
time a UK Prime Minister attended was in July 2007.
The emergence of bilateral IGCs
Constitutional asymmetry has necessitated bilateral relations. In contrast to
multilateral forums like the JMC and the BIC, bilateral exchanges are regarded,
especially by devolved governments, as a more effective means of raising
issues of concern directly with the UK Government, with more opportunities
for influencing outcomes (see, for example, Robinson, 2015). For the most
part, bilateral relations are conducted informally. In recent years, however, a
new semi-formal machinery of bilateral IGCs has been introduced in Scotland
and Wales, emerging from changes in the devolution settlements.4
The most notable of these are the Joint Exchequer Committees (JECs). The
primary purpose of the JECs was to facilitate the transfer of new tax and bor-
rowing powers derived from the Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016, and the
Wales Acts of 2014 and 2017. In the Scottish case, these included full
powers over landfill tax, stamp duty land tax and air passenger duty, new bor-
rowing limits, and steadily increasing responsibility for income tax. Income tax
collection and the broader policy framework remain centralized, but following
the 2016 Act, the Scottish Government, subject to parliamentary approval, is
now responsible for setting the rates, thresholds and bands for all income tax
on earnings above the personal allowance (Lecca et al., 2017). In Wales, landfill
tax and stamp duty land tax were similarly devolved, along with new borrow-
ing powers and more modest income tax devolution. From 2018, the UK Gov-
ernment will create tax room by reducing the basic, higher and additional
rates of income tax for Welsh tax payers by 10 percentage points, leaving
the National Assembly for Wales to approve the Welsh Government’s rates
for each band (Poole et al., 2016). These constitutional reforms meant that
new fiscal frameworks had to be negotiated bilaterally. Issues included agree-
ing a mechanism for ‘block grant adjustment’ to reduce the size of fiscal trans-
fers in light of increased tax autonomy, limits and rules on borrowing, and
compensatory rules to avoid one level of government being detrimentally
affected in terms of revenues or spending by the policy decisions of
another (the so-called ‘no detriment’ principle). Although conducted in separ-
ate forums, the often challenging experience of the Scottish negotiations
informed the development of the Welsh JEC.
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In its first incarnation in Scotland, the purpose of the JEC and the relative
status and influence of the two governments were never agreed; indeed, dis-
agreement over the ‘terms of reference’ represented an early area of conten-
tion within the committee, reflecting the contrasting perception of the status
and authority of each government (JEC, 2011). In this early phase, there was
no mechanism for resolving disputes. Consequently, the JEC did not meet
at all between 2013 and 2015 when negotiations on block grant adjustment
reached stalemate. As one former official engaged in the process noted, there
were so many other things going on (notably the run-up to the independence
referendum) that the issues of dispute in the JEC got added to the ‘too diffi-
cult’ pile (interview with former SG official, 14 December 2016).
The JEC was resurrected during the passage of the legislation which would
become the Scotland Act 2016, and became the site of intense intergovern-
mental interaction around the contentious issues of how best to adjust the
block grant and implement the ‘no detriment’ principles. These were high
stakes negotiations – without agreement, both the Scottish Government
and the Scottish Parliament seemed set to withhold consent for the Scotland
Bill – which could have seen the devolution legislation fall just weeks prior to
the Scottish election. In the event, after 10 inter-ministerial meetings, 5 of
which took place over a 5-week period in January–February 2016, a last-
gasp compromise agreement was reached in a telephone call between the
Prime Minister and the Scottish First Minister (Bell et al., 2016; HM Govern-
ment/Scottish Government, 2016). The process was less combative in the
Welsh case and took less time to agree (a rather different) Fiscal Framework
for Wales (HM Government/Welsh Government, 2016; Poole et al., 2017).
The process may have been eased by the preparatory work on Welsh territor-
ial finance already carried out by the Independent Commission on Funding
and Finance for Wales (Holtham Commission) and the Commission on Devo-
lution in Wales (Silk Commission), the support for its recommendations across
the political spectrum and within the wider policy community, as well as the
UK Government’s desire to avoid another tense and bruising experience in
devolution negotiations.
The evolution of the JEC as an example of a bilateral IGC suggests that
these operate somewhat differently from the multilateral IGCs discussed
above. They are more task-oriented than regular JMC meetings, primarily to
facilitate the transfer of new competences and their implementation.
Although the long-term use of these forums is not yet clear, there is an expec-
tation that the JECs will be utilized to manage the institutional and financial
interdependencies created by the new devolution settlements.
From the point of view of the devolved governments, these bilateral IGCs
are forums of equal partners. This was not always a view shared by the UK
Government, though its approach changed depending on the ministerial
representatives involved, and evolved over time. One former UK Government
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minister attending an early meeting of the JEC described it as the worst
meeting of his life, because of the intransigence of the Treasury and the
lack of understanding and sympathy its representatives had toward devolu-
tion (interview, 1 December 2016). A senior Scottish Government official
observed that the Treasury, a department whose role is usually to say ‘no’
to other departments’ budget requests, seemed caught off-guard by the
need to negotiate (interview, 22 April 2016). Some symbolic concessions to
parity were made. The location and chair of JEC meetings rotated between
London and Edinburgh or Cardiff. Moreover, the devolved governments
were able to negotiate significant concessions. The Scottish Government
secured agreement, subject to review, for its preferred method of block
grant adjustment, which protects it from losses as a result of differential popu-
lation growth. The Welsh Government secured a significant reform of the
Barnett formula as it applies to Wales, with the introduction of a needs-
based element in the calculation of fiscal transfers, addressing a long-
running grievance. Both governments secured agreement for some indepen-
dent oversight of the framework, once implemented – a concession described
by one devolved minister as a significant deviation from the working culture
of the Treasury (Drakeford, 2017a).
There remains an imbalance in the constitutional authority and resource
capacity of each government which would suggest that in any bilateral nego-
tiation, the deck may be stacked in the UK Government’s favour. However, the
JEC experiences, as with others before it, illustrate how some of the counter-
balancing mechanisms Panke (2010) and others have observed in small state
diplomacy can be observed within intra-state intergovernmental relations.
The Scottish Government and the Welsh Government put more stock in secur-
ing positive outcomes from intergovernmental negotiations. As a result, they
invest more time and effort identifying key issues and preparing their case,
and carry more institutional knowledge about devolution issues. As one obser-
ver noted of the Scottish Government in intergovernmental negotiations,
‘they do their homework, they have the politics better, and the intellectual
arguments better’ (interview with former UK Government minister, 1 Decem-
ber 2016). Officials suggested that Whitehall finds it difficult to sustain interest
in issues which, from its perspective, seem peripheral, and there are far fewer
personnel with knowledge of devolution issues (interview with SG official, 22
April 2016; see also Paun and Munro, 2015). As an illustration, soon after the
UK–Scottish Fiscal Framework Agreement was secured, the three Treasury offi-
cials most central to the negotiations moved to other departments.
Power dynamics within bilateral IGCs associated with constitutional reform
are also shaped by constitutional convention and practice. The UK parliament
retains jurisdictional authority for the constitution, and so is legally solely
responsible for determining reallocations of power. In practice, however,
the process of constitutional reform has usually been driven from within
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the devolved nations themselves, often with the explicit support of the UK
Government. Territorially based commissions make recommendations, and
decisions over the transfer of new powers are sometimes instigated or legit-
imized by referenda. In accordance with a constitutional convention (often
referred to as the Sewel convention), which was itself incorporated into the
Scotland Act (2016) and the Wales Act (2017), the Westminster Parliament
will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the
consent of the devolved legislatures, expressed in legislative consent
motions (LCM). According to the Scottish Deputy First Minister, such consti-
tutional practice shaped negotiations within the JEC, following the stipulation
of the inter-party Smith Commission report (which paved the way for the Scot-
land Act 2016) that the two governments agree on a new fiscal framework. ‘It
was not “it would be nice to”; it had to be agreed between both Governments.
That obviously put a particular discipline on getting to an acceptable con-
clusion for both parties’ (Swinney, 2016). The Welsh Cabinet Secretary
noted that ‘had we not had a fiscal framework, it would have been a very sig-
nificant barrier to supporting an LCM on the Wales Bill and the Treasury were
very well aware of that’ (Drakeford, 2017a).
IGCs and Brexit
The UK’s planned withdrawal from the European Union promises to affect sig-
nificantly the relations between the constituent nations of the UK. The refer-
endum result was an expression of British self-determination, following a
campaign urging voters to ‘take back control’. In Scotland, where 62%
voted Remain, it brought the issue of Scottish independence back on to the
political agenda. The prospect and impact of a hard border on the island of
Ireland, meanwhile, is one of the biggest issues in negotiations with the EU.
These and other territorial challenges unleashed by the referendum result
have overshadowed the conduct of intergovernmental relations.
The early phase of the Brexit process – from the referendum until the trig-
gering of article 50 – led to an intensification of multilateral intergovernmen-
tal relations, especially through formal IGCs. After almost two years without
meeting, the JMC(P) was reconvened in October 2016 and met again three
months later. The first of these meetings led to the creation of a new sub-com-
mittee, the JMC (EU Negotiations), to facilitate intra-UK negotiations and
coordination related to Brexit (JMC, 2016). At the second, the leaders
agreed to ‘intensify their work ahead of the triggering of Article 50 and to
continue at the same pace thereafter’ (JMC, 2017). The JMC(EN) met four
times between November 2016 and February 2017, chaired by the UK
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. It took eight months for
it to reconvene following concerted efforts by Welsh and Scottish ministers
for its resumption (Drakeford and Russell, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017).
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Unlike the other JMCs, the purpose of the JMC(EN) was much more focused
and task-oriented, with the expectation of follow-up. Its remit, agreed by the
JMC(P), committed the four governments to ‘seek to agree a UK approach to,
and objectives for, Article 50 negotiations’ and to provide oversight of Brexit
negotiations once underway ‘to ensure, as far as possible, that outcomes
agreed by all four governments are secured from these negotiations’ (JMC,
2016). The JMC(EN) provided an opportunity to discuss papers presented by
each of the devolved governments. The Welsh Cabinet Secretary suggested
that his government’s paper, which had emphasized the need for ‘free and
unfettered access’ to the single market, influenced the language of ‘free
and frictionless trade’ subsequently adopted by the UK Government,
perhaps mirroring the successful norm advocacy of small states in EU policy
and practice (Björkdahl, 2008; Drakeford, 2017b).
It would be a considerable stretch, though, to regard the JMC(EN) as a
channel through which the devolved governments have been able to date,
to exert meaningful influence. Having raised expectations that the JMC(EN)
would seek joint agreement on a UK approach prior to the triggering of
Article 50, it singularly failed to do so. The Prime Minister’s Lancaster House
speech setting down some parameters of the UK approach to Brexit was
delivered without consultation, let alone agreement, with the devolved gov-
ernments. Nor was there consultation on the content or detail of the Article
50 letter sent to the President of the European Council which formally
opened the negotiations. Devolved government ministers pointed towards
a lack of consultation, information-sharing and poor organization of JMC
(EN) meetings. Mark Drakeford described it as a ‘frustrating process’ that
has ‘failed to give confidence to devolved Administrations that… (their)
views are making a genuine impact on the thinking of the UK Government’
(Drakeford, 2017b). Michael Russell, Minister for UK Negotiations on Scot-
land’s Place in Europe, described it as ‘unnecessarily frustrating, and a
wasted opportunity’ (Rhodes, 2017). By contrast, the Secretary of State for
Exiting the European Union claimed that the UK Government had ‘bent
over backwards’ to take heed of concerns in the devolved nations (David,
2017: 14). Privately, UK Government officials conceded that the remit of the
JMC(EN) created expectations that would always have been difficult to
meet (interview with UK Government official, 8 May 2017).
The JMC(EN) faced some practical and political barriers. The intensification
of IGR, in the context of the dramatic organizational impact of Brexit on White-
hall more generally, created resource challenges. Ministers from devolved
governments complained about poor administration, communication and
the absence, or late circulation of, minutes, agendas and a meaningful work
programme (House of Lords EU Committee, 2017: 67–72). The collapse of
the Northern Ireland Executive prior to the triggering of Article 50 rendered
a four-party agreement within the JMC impossible. Such agreement was in
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any event unlikely, given the divergent positions and political mandates of the
governments. Yet, the JMC(EN) process also laid bare the challenges of oper-
ating IGCs in the UK in the context of perceived and actual constitutional hier-
archy. The UK Government recognizes the right of the devolved governments
to be consulted with respect to the negotiations, among other stakeholders,
but not to co-determine the UK position, nor to exercise veto power over any
aspect of the process (see HM Government, 2016; David, 2017: Q7). Moreover,
the Secretary of State’s testimony to the Lords EU Committee, and the inter-
ventions of senior Scottish Government ministers, reveals the extent to which
the politics of independence overshadow intergovernmental relations,
especially on high salience issues. The competing nationalist agendas of the
UK and Scottish governments, in particular, inhibit the development of
common goals, trusting relationships and shared confidences.
Concluding remarks
Intergovernmental relations in the UK are shaped by the nature of the UK con-
stitution, the asymmetric distribution of power and the territorial politics that
drive the evolution of devolution. The piecemeal and ad hoc approach to con-
stitutional reform emerged without much consideration to the formal mech-
anisms that may be required to manage the evolving system of multi-level
government. Successive UK Governments, in collaboration with the devolved
governments, established and utilized IGCs as and when needed. Day-to-day
informal interactions were thus supposed to be the norm, and for the first
eight years of devolution, they were. With the exception of its European
format, the JMC was moribund. Neither the UK nor the devolved governments
saw the need to use it. Informal interactions were supported by party political
congruence; governments were not competing against one another electo-
rally, ideologically or territorially, and ministers mostly knew one another
through party channels. Generous financial settlements also contributed to
minimizing intergovernmental tension.
From 2007 onwards, concurrent developments drew attention from gov-
ernments, parliaments and observers to the need for more robust IGCs, and
although still sporadic when contrasted with more institutionalized systems,
they have seen increased use since then. With regard to the five purposes
of IGCs set out in the analytical framework above, they are less focused on
negotiating agreements and coordinating action, and more on information-
sharing and, where necessary, resolving disputes. But even here, informal
channels are preferred to achieve these ends. From the UK Government’s per-
spective, the JMC is a forum that can enable it to consult with and update the
devolved governments and consider their points of view. These viewpoints
may inform policy development, but they are unlikely to determine it. The
devolution settlements have sought to make a clear distinction between
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the respective jurisdiction of each level of government and, despite obvious
policy interdependencies, the scope for genuine co-decision has been limited.
Within multilateral IGCs, in particular, the constitutional superiority of the
UK Government and the relative weakness of the constitutional authority of
the devolved governments has tended to overshadow the non-constitutional
resources the latter could bring, and so limiting the extent to which they could
exert meaningful influence. It was against this backdrop that we saw an inten-
sification of the JMC process in the context of Brexit. Yet, expectations that this
would lead to more focused, more collaborative and more equal deliberations
and decision-making were dashed by the experiences of its first few months.
The absence of federalism is not only apparent in the structures and distri-
bution of constitutional authority. It is also apparent in the culture that per-
vades IGR. For the most part, the UK Government neither thinks nor acts
like a federal government. Recent initiatives to foster understanding of devo-
lution across Whitehall notwithstanding (Rycroft, 2015), the recognition within
at least some federal states of the need to work at maintaining the federation
through regular intergovernmental communication and negotiation has been
lacking within the UK Government for much of the period of devolution.
Reforms to the devolution settlements are the notable exception, however.
Although formally a matter for the UK parliament alone, the Sewel convention
has given the devolved institutions informal authority, augmented by their
niche expertise and sustained interest in devolution matters. As a result,
they have been able to exert real influence over the scope of revisions to
devolved powers, both informally and especially in bilateral IGCs such as
the Joint Exchequer Committees. As such, for the devolved governments,
the bilateral IGCs have served a purpose of both exercising shared rule and
defending and maximizing their jurisdictional autonomy, with varying
degrees of emphasis.
Although the Welsh and Scottish Governments have worked collabora-
tively in airing their dissatisfaction with the intergovernmental processes,
especially in relation to Brexit, their broader motivations are not as aligned.
Constitutional hierarchies and resource imbalances mean that the need for
devolved governments to engage with and access the UK Government is
greater than the latter’s need to engage with them. But intergovernmental
engagement matters most to the Welsh Government, which may explain
why it has taken a lead on advocating reform. Constitutionally, economically
and politically, it is weaker than its Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts,
with a weaker voice and no exit strategy that could add leverage to intergo-
vernmental negotiations. This may explain why strengthening shared rule
through a significant institutionalization of intergovernmental relations – as
proposed recently (Welsh Government, 2017) – has been a far greater priority
for the Welsh Government than for its counterparts. For its part, the Scottish
Government’s participation within IGCs, especially under the SNP
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administration, has been motivated by its desire to defend territorial interests
and maximize its decision-making autonomy. These predominantly national-
ist motivations can act as a barrier to co-decision and compromise, limiting
the scope for the development of processes of shared rule.
It is impossible to isolate the distinctive effects on the purpose and
dynamics of IGCs of changes which occurred simultaneously. Party political
incongruence between the administrations, the election of the Scottish
National Party, the intensity of constitutional debates before and after the
Scottish independence referendum, the restoration of devolution in Northern
Ireland, the effects of fiscal austerity on territorial finance, and new consti-
tutional reforms have all shaped the development and dynamics of intergo-
vernmental relations. These political and constitutional developments
resulted in greater use of IGCs, but also exposed their shortcomings and
heightened dissatisfaction, especially among devolved governments.
Finding mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation between
the UK’s governing administrations to their mutual satisfaction remains one
of the biggest challenges in UK territorial politics.
Notes
1. The Northern Ireland Assembly was established in 1999, following the ‘Good
Friday Agreement’ which was endorsed by the UK Government, the Irish Gov-
ernment and eight political parties in Northern Ireland (excluding the DUP,
which has been the leading Unionist party, and largest party in the Assembly,
since 2007). The Agreement was also backed by popular majorities in separate
referenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic – the latter endorsed an
amendment to the Irish constitution which permitted the Agreement’s ratifica-
tion. Amid ongoing difficulties in securing peace and conflict resolution, the
Assembly’s early years were dogged by periods of suspension: between Febru-
ary and May 2000; 24-hour suspensions in August 2001 and September 2001;
and from October 2002. A transitional assembly was set up in October 2006,
paving the way for the restoration of devolution in 2007. A period of relative
stability followed until 2017, when the government collapsed amid a financial
scandal.
2. I use the term ‘intergovernmental council’ or IGC to conform to the terminology
of this special issue, though the term itself does not feature prominently among
scholars or practitioners of UK IGR.
3. In line with the Concordat, ministers from the devolved governments can be
invited to attend EU Council meetings as part of the UK negotiating team.
Whereas for Agriculture and Fisheries Council meetings, attendance was com-
monplace, it was more sporadic or rare in others (informal email exchange
with Scottish Government official, August 2017).
4. A separate parallel process led to increased fiscal transfers and a pledge to
devolve corporation tax in Northern Ireland, but this was part of a broader set
of discussions between the Northern Ireland Executive, the UK Government
and the Irish Government to address a fiscal crisis, confront paramilitary activity,
and stabilize devolution and peace.
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